Kicking & Screaming
A survey of academic literature on abortion
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There are a handful of dinner table topics deemed taboo because nearly any discussion explodes into emotion and ignores all reason. While contemporary understanding of abortion is divided into two stark camps, pro-life and pro-choice, academic approaches invoke far more complex reasoning to justify or denounce the morality of the issue. This paper will summarize everyday views, examine the two classic syllogisms through a scholarly lens, and discuss persistent debates among even moderate positions.
The general public’s understanding of abortion is constrained by a lack of analytical thinking. Gibson summarizes this exceptionally well when she defines an “extreme conservative” position in which abortion is never justifiable and an “extreme liberal” position in which abortion is always permissible (1). She also outlines the simple logic often used to justify each position. The conservative argument assumes it is wrong to kill a fetus because it is a person. Religion is often used as justification for this interpretation of when personhood begins. To defend abortion, a rudimentary liberal argument often invokes the inverse: a fetus is not a person, but a mother is, so it morally justified if she chooses to abort. This argument, similarly, rests on the sub-claim that a fetus is not a person, as well as the extent of the mother’s assumed rights. The scholars’ thoughts discussed in the remainder of the paper seek to further develop these lines of logic and introduce additional reasoning to persuade readers on the morality of abortion.
Let us begin by questioning the logic presented in the conventional conservative syllogism: a fetus is a person, it is wrong to kill people; therefore, it is wrong to kill a fetus. While scholars and society both accept the moral wrong of murder, personhood remains a fundamental debate within abortion because the right to life is only attributed to persons (Lee, 39). Lee makes a strong claim that personhood begins at conception when he says “we are not consciousnesses that possess or inhabit bodies. Rather, we are living bodily entities” (39). He means that it impossible for a psychological component capable of being defined as our “personhood” to exist separately from our physical bodies, which begin existing from the moment the sperm and egg cells form a zygote. His support for this argument does not go much further than invoking a colloquial understanding of what is referred to when one uses personal pronouns (40). Noonan further defends this early right by drawing on theologians’ previous claim that “if you are conceived by human parents, you are human” (260) and a sense that fetuses begin to respond to touch at eight weeks, and consequently begin to experience humanity at this time. Warren offers a sharp counterargument, however, when she defines six criteria of personhood: sentience, capacity for emotions, reason, ability to communicate, self-awareness, and moral agency (136). She argues that because early fetuses are not sentient, it is hard to imagine them as possessing any of these six characteristics. Warren moderates her argument by conceding that an entity need not meet all six criteria to be considered a person, but that “the more criteria…satisfied, the more confident we are that [the entity is a person]” (136). Marquis, an anti-abortionist, renders all personhood arguments irrelevant by claiming that “one is left no way of showing that the fetus is fully human without begging the question” (143). Acknowledging that Lee’s argument rests on many unsupported warrants and that Warren’s claim likewise establishes arbitrary criteria, Marquis turns to the typically unexamined second premise in the traditional syllogism. He seeks to understand what characteristics make it wrong to kill an adult human and inquire if fetuses have these same qualities. The conclusion he reaches is that taking away a FLO, or “future like ours” (Marquis, 145), is what makes killing wrong in conventional society. He offers many examples of how the FLO explanation fits with general understandings of morality. Euthanasia is regarded as morally acceptable because the patient has no positive future, whether their illness is fatal, chronically painful, or renders them in a permanent comatose state. Yet society strives to intervene in suicide attempts because we can see a positive FLO for the individual, even if they cannot see it for themselves (Marquis, 145). One inherent flaw in the FLO argument, however, is that it assumes potential personhood to be equal with actual personhood. Marquis acknowledges this potential weakness and attempts to rebut it by comparing the potentiality inherent in the FLO of a fully developed human to the FLO of a fetus (147). While the FLO argument itself does assume that the potential future for any person is what matters, it also assumes that these individuals have at one point in time valued this future for themselves. This is a premise Warren partially explored in her discussion of six criteria for personhood, as is suggested in the line “persons who have permanently…lost all capacity for sentience…have strong moral rights by virtue of what they have been in the past” (136). Moderate Little compounds the discussion of potentiality by emphasizing both the actual trajectory a being takes and the role of the being’s environment in forming this trajectory (53). Thus, the stalemate of the linear conservative argument lies in its inability to reconcile which characteristic(s) would attribute morality to a fetus.
The classical liberal syllogism asserts that because a fetus is not a person, they have no right to life; therefore, a mother’s right to control her own body prevails. The unresolved personhood argument discussed in relation to the conservative line of logic remains relevant in examination of liberal views, as well. Judith Thomson asserts the strongest and most renowned argument in favor of abortion by allowing the premise that personhood begins at conception, despite its slippery slope logic, for purposes of presenting a counterargument. The reader is presented with an elaborate scenario in which he or she is supposedly kidnapped and wakes in a hospital to find him or herself connected to a famous violinist. The musician can only recover from a life-threatening ailment should he be allowed use of your kidneys for nine months. The discussion revolves around whether or not the reader is obligated to allow the use of their body – in this case the obligation originated against the reader’s will – for the violinist’s survival. She claims that while supporting the violinist would be a nice thing to do, or an act characteristic of an “Extremely Good Samaritan” as Warren mentions (136), one is certainly not obligated to carry out that course of action (Thomson, 125). While this case operates on the notion that the reader did not play a role in the existence of their potential nine-month commitment, similar to pregnancy by rape, Thomson offers two premises to extend her argument. She makes an unsupported claim that the right to abortion can transcend this necessary condition because “the question of whether you have a right to life…shouldn’t turn on the question of whether or not you are a product of rape” (Thomson, 125). The second tactic is far more effective and explores cases in which consensual sex caused the unwanted pregnancy. She employs yet another analogy, in which a woman opening a window does not mean she has welcomed burglars into her home. This concept is stronger when applied specifically to contraceptive failure, as illustrated if a woman was to install bars on her windows but the burglar discovered one to be defective (Thomson, 129). Feinberg attempts to demonstrate that women do not have a right to this bodily autonomy in all cases. He illustrates first that a woman does not own a fetus but merely shelters it and proceeds to limit the right to self-defense to only cases that pose a grave danger to a pregnant woman’s life (Feinberg, 272). He outlines a few cases in which a woman may not be obligated to carry to term: rape, contraceptive failure by company error, and contraceptive failure by the one percent margin of error (Feinberg, 272). Little, again, offers a number of factors that compound a woman’s responsibility to carry her fetus to term. In addition to traditional burdens such as financial cost, relational strain, and physical toll, Little emphasizes the deep shift in identity that “authoring a life” exacts (53). She characterizes the relationship between fetus and mother as a deep emotional bond. She rationalizes some cases by saying that, “continuing a pregnancy…would violate the woman’s commitments of respectful creation” (60). Such examples include women in deeply repressive societies where they fear their child might face racial or gender barriers to a happy life. In this way, these women still experience an obligation to assist their fetus, but execution of that obligation depends on the pregnancy’s context. Deeper examination of a liberal argument, in which personhood is relevant but not quite a central factor, reveals the truly unresolved question: what, if anything, obligates a woman to her fetus? This concept leads to a graduated approach discussed by many scholars.
A majority of moderate opinions contend abortion becomes less morally permissible as the fetus further develops. However, debate continues in regards to what specific developmental criteria for permissibility, if any, might look like and when along a pregnancy it might appear. English suggests that each woman navigates her own route of self-defense, in which she seeks to “avoid harms rather than equaliz[e] harms” (276). As a general rule, she offers that abortion is not always morally justifiable; it is okay in the first semester when the fetus least resembles a person, questionable in the second semester, and should be restricted to medical emergency in the third trimester (English, 278). Easterbrook confirms this graduation of the issue as shown when he says, “public understanding has not kept pace with scientific discovery” (266). The discovery he references is that complex brain activity begins in a fetus’ third trimester, which coincides chronologically with their viability outside the womb. Brain activity has been criticized as defining criteria because earlier fetuses have the potential to have brain activity, thus invoking the potentiality argument once again (Lee, 39). Noonan offers strong rebuttal against viability as a turning point for abortion’s morality by arguing that children remain dependent on their caretakers for years (260). This argument, however, equates viability and dependence without backing and does not explore the newly implied obligation of women to care for all children until independent, which would be unmet in cases of adoption. Gibson also discards viability as it varies significantly in regard to changes in time and space, as medical technology has advanced over time and is more accessible in developed countries (3).
Abortion appears intractable because, in part, it is. Scholars utilizing vast research and articulate rhetoric still find one another susceptible to logical fallacies. This failure to produce logical rationale justifies the division on morality of the issue. Conservatives maintain personhood from conception and deprivation of a future like ours as clear evidence that abortion is morally wrong in most cases. A more liberal view of the issue often justifies abortion through a right to bodily autonomy and defines personhood as beginning late-term or at birth. A view in which abortion becomes increasingly wrong as the fetus further develops emphasizes respective confidence in personhood over the course of a pregnancy. It is impossible for this division to be simultaneously represented in practical policy and action, and this inherent inequality generates the tension characteristic of the abortion debate.
Works Cited
Easterbrook, Greg. “Gregg Easterbrook Argues that Third-Trimester Abortions—but those Only—Should be Tightly Restricted,” in T. Davis Thomas, Contemporary Moral and Social Issues: An Introduction Through Original Fiction, Discussion, and Readings, Wiley, 2014.
English, Jane. “Jane English Thinks a Moderate Position on Abortion Can be Justified, Whether or Not the Fetus is Conceived as a Person,” in T. Davis Thomas, Contemporary Moral and Social Issues: An Introduction Through Original Fiction, Discussion, and Readings, Wiley, 2014.
Feinberg, Joel and Barbara Baum Levenbook. “Joel Feinberg and Barbara Baum Levenbook Consider the Claim that Even if the Fetus is a Person, the Interests of the Mother Justify Abortion in Many Cases,” in T. Davis Thomas, Contemporary Moral and Social Issues: An Introduction Through Original Fiction, Discussion, and Readings, Wiley, 2014.
Gibson, Susanne. “Abortion,” in R. Chadwick (ed.), Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, Elsevier, 2012.
Lee, Patrick and Robert George. “The Wrong of Abortion,” in A. Cohen and C. Heath Wellman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, John Wiley and Sons, 2014.
Little, Margaret Olivia. “The Moral Permissibility of Abortion,” in A. Cohen and C. Heath Wellman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, John Wiley and Sons, 2014.
Marquis, Don. “An Argument that Abortion in Wrong,” in H. LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, John Wiley & Sons, 2014.
Noonan, John. “John T. Noonan, Jr. Argues that Abortion is Morally Wrong,” in T. Davis Thomas, Contemporary Moral and Social Issues: An Introduction Through Original Fiction, Discussion, and Readings, Wiley, 2014.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. “A Defense of Abortion,” in H. LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, John Wiley & Sons, 2014.
Warren, Mary Anne. “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion,” in H. LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, John Wiley & Sons, 2014.